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Abstract
The Norwegian Armed Forces are supposed to implement Network based
Defence within the next couple of decades, but the implementation process
is suffering from different obstacles, putting military operations at stake. The
purpose of this research was to identify factors delaying the implementation
process, and to investigate if the delay would have a negative impact
on the users’ perceived trust. Practical research consisting of interviews
and questionnaires, and adapted system dynamic models from the oil
sector were employed as methodologies to investigate the implementation
process. The research identified inappropriate technological solutions,
education of operators at random, complex information collection together
with inadequate level of perceived trust among the operators as possible
obstacles. The obstacles introduce gaps between technology implemented
and knowledge needed to utilize it, possibly also affecting the operators’
perceived trust. This paper suggests employing a full-fledged system
dynamic model in parallel with the implementation process to ensure
implementation in time, within the estimated cost and with reduced risk.
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1 Introduction
Technology has changed the way military operations are conducted throughout the
twentieth century, and most of the communication is today conducted via technological
networks. It has been a shift from personal interaction to dependence on technology,
to achieve the stated objectives. Owing to budget pressure, the number of soldiers and
officers are reduced simultaneously as the objectives are maintained. Operations depend
on information delivered via the networks, whether it is position data visualized as friend
(blue spot) or foe (red spot) on an interactive map, or information delivered as intelligence
directly from the soldiers via the networks.
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Figure 1: Conceptual model of Network Based Defence
The Norwegian Armed Forces are supposed to implement Network based Defence
within the next couple of decades [7] to achieve information superiority and to enable
speed of command during operations. The transition from traditional to Network
based operations implicates a shift from platform based operations to network centric
operations. The implementation is however suffering from different obstacles that are
challenging and slowing down the process. Some operative units are impatiently adjusting
solutions for testing of Network based Defence, but the Defence in total has lacking
will and ability for implementation [20]. The delayed implementation affects the entire
Norwegian Armed Forces, and can put soldier lives and operations at stake. The purpose
of this research was to identify factors delaying the implementation process of Network
based Defence. Another aspect of the research was to investigate if the delay would
have a negative impact on the users’ perceived trust. Practical research consisting of
interviews and questionnaires was employed to investigate the implementation process of
Network based Defence. In addition, adapted system dynamic models from the oil sector
were employed to model the transition from traditional to network-based operations in
the Norwegian Defence. This research identified several obstacles related to knowledge
introducing gaps between technology implemented and knowledge needed to utilize it.
This might in turn also affect the operators’ perceived trust.
2 Background
Network based Defence is comparable to the concept Network Centric Warfare (NCW).
Both concepts seek to utilize network connected information systems in order to achieve
information superiority [4]. The main idea is to connect intelligent sensors, command
and control systems together with precision weapons, to enable enhanced situational
awareness, rapid target assessment and distributed weapon assignment [16]. The concept
of NCW also has the ability to enable development of speed of command, leading to more
effective operations and disruption of the enemy’s strategy [4]. The strategic objective of
Network based Defence is to efficiently utilize technological infrastructure to support
network based national operations and network based operations abroad [7]. A successful
implementation relies on compatible systems, an excellent information infrastructure
and intellectual capital [4]. In addition, technology, organization and doctrines must
be aligned to each other. Hence, Network based Defence is to perceive technology,
organization, competence and processes in a common context [6].
The concept of Network based Defence is illustrated in figure 1, where various
network components are connected together in networks. The idea is that data and
information continuously are collected from different sensors, and transmitted into the
system for processing and analysing. Processed and analysed information is then
distributed to appropriate levels of the command hierarchy to support current and future
operations. The increased amount of processed and analysed information has the
possibility to increase the situational awareness (SA) for commanders in all levels of
the organization. Better SA supports faster and more correct decisions, enhances the
cooperation and coordination between different entities.
Studied literature indicated that technology often is implemented much faster than
relevant new knowledge, organization and doctrines are developed ([5] and [4]). Thus,
there is a risk that technology, procedures and intellectual capital are not aligned also
for Network based Defence. Comparable processes and consequences were found in
a work done by Rich et al [19] and Qian [17]. They used system dynamic models to
study Integrated Operations in the oil sector, modelling the transition from traditional to
network-based operations. What they found, was if knowledge is not developed in parallel
with the operation transition when technology is implemented, vulnerability is affected.
As knowledge is an antecedent of trust and also a prerequisite to situational awareness
([21]), possible vulnerabilities introduced into the process might be inadequate level of
trust and inappropriate situational awareness.
Trust is defined "to believe that someone is good and honest and will not harm
you, or that something is safe and reliable" [3]. Trust is therefore tightly connected
to the user’s perception. As described by Jian et al [11], people do not perceive trust
differently whether the relationship was general trust, human-human trust or human-
machine trust. This indicates that results from studies related to human-human relations,
also can be employed to understand the trust between humans and networked systems.
Lee [12] emphasized that appropriate trust is necessary to achieve superior performance
in a human–automation system. It is therefore important that the operators get proper
training in order to understand the intended use of the system, and expected reliability.
Too low trust in the system can affect the operator’s willingness to employ it [2]. On
the flip side, too high reliance on the system can result in the operator not noticing
system fails. Inappropriate perceived trust, meaning both too high or too low trust in
the system or to the information presented by the systems, can be caused by unreliable
systems. In addition, inappropriate percieved trust can be caused by lack of competence
and experience in employing the technical platform. Inadequate perceived trust and
inappropriate competency might in turn result in inappropriate use of the technical
platform and wrong interpretation of the information ([12] and [15]).
Research questions
Studied literature together with preliminary study of system dynamic models from
Integrated Operations served as a basis to deduce five research questions:
RQ1: How are the two processes of operation transition and knowledge development in
Network based Defence adjusted to each other?
RQ2: Which factors related to knowledge affect the implementation of Network based
Defence?
RQ3: How are the identified factors related to knowledge and situational awareness
affecting the operators’ perceived trust?
RQ4: How will the perceived trust affect the implementation of Network based Defence?
RQ5: How will a system dynamic model simplify and reduce risk related to the integration
of Network based Defence?
3 Methodologies
To investigate the five research questions, 2 different methodologies were used. System
dynamic models from Integrated Operations in the oil industry were adapted and
employed to model the transition from traditional to network-based operations in the
Norwegian Armed Forces. This was based on the assumption that the processes
related to transition to Integrated Operations and the transformation to Network based
Defence shared the basics of introduction of new processes that required creation of new
knowledge. Practical research including interviews and questionnaires were conducted in
two different army units.
System dynamic models
System Dynamic (SD) models are high level descriptions of problem-relevant features of
a reality domain. They are less complex and easier for humans to understand than the real
world [23] and model a problem over time. Some details will be lost, but simplicity assists
thinking and decision making. In addition the models serve as good communication
tools. The methodology helps identifying unintentional effects acting against the stated
objectives. This insight can be employed to understand how various problems can be
solved. Qualitative SD models serve as a basis to develop quantitative models with the
possibility to simulate future scenarios.
In this research, the objective was to find obstacles slowing down the implementation
of Network based Defence. One assumption was that the lack of knowledge and skills
act as counter forces to Network based Defence achievement, creating unintentional
effects in the total system. Unintentional effects in this context will be related to
possible vulnerabilities increasing the probability of risk. Unadjusted processes related
to the implementation of Integrated Operations were identified by Rich et al [19] and
further developed by Qian in her PhD work "Mitigating Information security risks during
the Transition to Integrated Operations" [17]. Similar to Integrated Operations, the
transformation to Network based Defence introduces new vulnerabilities as new processes
are introduced simultaneously as old ones are phased out. New processes will require
new knowledge. The implementation is endeavoring, lasting for several decades, making
the processes and knowledge related to Network based Defence interact in unexpected
ways. The traditional way of doing risk and security analysis is based on analysis
of previous events and historical data, in addition to vulnerability identification [9].
Because the transformation will include implementation of new technological equipment
and information technology, there are no existing records of previous events [19]. In
addition, Network based Defence and Integrated Operations share several similarities.
Both systems include sensors, and they present current status based on reported inputs.
If the inputs are wrong, the situational picture is also wrong. To utilize the system, the
operators need proper education and training, and the user interface must be expedient
([19] and [4]). Lack of knowledge and misunderstandings might in both cases result
in fatal consequences for ongoing operations. Historically, SD models were often
employed in the safety domain, but the model is also applicable for problems related
to information security ([8] and [22]). System dynamic models from Ying Qian’s work
related to Integrated Operations are therefore adapted in order to study the two processes
of operation transition and knowledge development in Network based Defence in parallel.
The adapted SD models are denoted preliminary SD models of NbF. NbF is used as an
abbreviation for Network based Defence (Nettverksbasert Forsvar in Norwegian spelling).
The practical research
The focus of this research was to investigate how knowledge is considered in relation
to the implementation process of Network based Defence. Competence, training and
experience are important prerequisites to situational awareness [21], and all of them are
antecedents of trust. Practical research was therefore employed to investigate knowledge
from 4 different angles, assuming to be of relevance for situational awareness and
perceived trust among the users. The 4 focus areas were: 1) Knowledge for how to
develop a technological platform supporting military operations. 2) The user’s knowledge
of how to utilize the technological platform. 3) Knowledge about the operational
objectives and the situational picture. 4) If the user knew to what extent it is possible
to trust information presented by the systems. In order to collect relevant information,
an interview guide and a questionnaire were developed. In order to make the interview
guide and the questionnaire more user friendly, the 4 focus areas were divided into
7 sub domains: Technical information systems, competence and training, information
collection and sharing, obstacles to information sharing, situational awareness, trust and
trustworthiness. Interviews and questionnaires were then carried out in two different
army units. In both units, personnel from three different levels were interviewed and
participated in the questionnaire, representing top level, intermediate level and lower
level carrying out the actual operations. 11 participants were interviewed and 17 persons
participated in the questionnaire. Some participated in both, so the total number of
participants were 22.
4 Results and discussion
This section includes a summary of the practical research. The results from the practical
research is then compared with adapted preliminary SD models of NbF.
Summary of findings from the practical research
The results from the questionnaire can be found in figure 2, including both the actual
questions and the responses. The interview guideline focused on the same main areas,
but searched to find some deeper answers to the addressed issues. A summary from the
practical research follows, looking into knowledge from 4 different angles. The results
from the practical research include answers related to research question 2 and 3.
Knowledge for developing a military technological platform
Most of the respondents seem to be pretty satisfied with the technical information
systems. Less of the participants seem to be satisfied with the technical support tools.
Complexity, difficult user interfaces and continuous development challenge the use of the
technological platform, requiring good, technical expertise which is a scarce resource.
Lack of ownership and responsibility seem to result in lack of common solutions. Large
and heavy equipment challenge the usability. The lack of interoperability within the
system and with other nations also support the assumption of unadjusted solutions. In
addition, technical challenges, functional errors, and systems not talking together, hamper
the information sharing. Hence, more time has to be spent to follow up that messages are
received and understood, stealing time from the actual operations. All the participants in
Figure 2: Results from the practical research including questions and responses.
the questionnaire more or less agreed that all the technical information systems enable
faster task performance. The reliability seems however to be challenged by inappropriate
hardware configurations, and that new hardware is added to old hardware continuously
without maintenance.
The user’s knowledge of how to utilize the technological platform
The majority of the participants seem to hold enough education and experience to
perform their duties and to understand and analyse information presented by the systems.
Experience was emphasized as an important factor for information comprehension. Less
of the participants seemed to hold enough competence to fully utilize the technological
platform. This can be explained by challenges related to turnover and competence
transfer. Regular practice based on vested interest and curiosity is however essential to
employ the solutions properly and get insight into advanced functionality. In general,
there is no comprehensive approach related to education, and user manuals are not
developed when new patches are released. This is a problem issue the respondents address
to a higher level of the military.
Figure 3: Parent model of Network based Defence implementation
Knowledge about operational objectives and the situation
The mission’s objective seems obvious for all the respondents. All of the participants
seem more or less aware of their own situation. The majority of the respondents find it
more difficult to understand the enemy’s situation. Education together with experience
is necessary to achieve the required level of situational awareness, but there are some
challenges. Information must be collected from several systems, including both manual
and technical systems. Noise and old information must be removed manually. To
verify that perceived situational awareness is correct and to avoid misunderstandings,
coordination is done by voice all the time. Misunderstandings still happen and sometimes
result in events with the possibility to escalate to incidents. None of the units seem to
have proper routines for registering events or incidents.
The user’s trust in information presented by the systems.
The practical research indicates that the operators trust information presented by the
communication system. Less of the participants seem to trust information presented by
other technical systems to full extent. Most of the participants seem to be aware that
information presented by the systems might be incorrect due to lacking details, that they
are manipulated or wrong. The ordinary user however, tends to trust and depend on the
graphical interface completely. In addition, the technical platforms are not employed
properly due to complexity. Test and verification are not done before released, possibly
resulting in reduced trust in the platform.
Practical results combined with preliminary SD models of NbF
To investigate the results from the practical research further, system dynamic models
from integrated operations were adapted to the transformation process of Network based
Defence. The SD models together with the results from the practical research served as a
basis to answer four of the research questions further.
How are the two processes of operation transition and knowledge development in Network
based Defence adjusted to each other?
The SD model in figure 3 is an archetype, which is a short-hand version of system dynamic
models. Archetypes are usually drawn as causal feedback loops, consisting of arrows
Figure 4: Conceptual model for the transition of NbF. Adapted from Qian [18]
connecting cause and effect. When cause and effect change in the same direction, the
arrow is marked with a plus sign. If the cause and effect change in opposite directions,
the arrow is marked with a minus sign. The SD model in figure 3 serves as a parent
model to explain the transformation from traditional operations to Network based Defence
and visualizes the first research question. The objective is to transform more and more
of the traditional operations to Network based Defence (NbF). This is visualized with
the reinforcing loop, R1: Integration of NbF. R1 is reinforcing itself, and the speed
of the transformation will increase when more of the operations are transformed into
NbF. But when more of the operations are transformed, the operators lack knowledge
and experience to conduct this new type of operations. Lack of knowledge will act as
a constraint, and a knowledge gap will appear. The knowledge gap will most likely
affect the operator’s perceived trust. After a while, (delayed), the balancing loop, B:
Knowledge in the shadow, will start acting against the intended outcome, reducing the
operation transition. To reduce the constraints and increase the transformation speed, the
organization needs to invest in relevant knowledge. This is illustrated with the reinforcing
loop, R2: Knowledge for successful integration. If the organization fails to invest in
relevant knowledge, the transformation process will be delayed, resulting in unexpected
consequences.
Studied literature of Network based Defence identified gaps and incompatibilities
between technology implemented and procedures and knowledge needed to utilize it.
Similar obstacles were identified during the practical research. Insufficient technological
solutions, education of operators at random and complex information collection and
sharing suggest that technology, procedures and intellectual capital are not aligned to
each other. The challenges are visualized in another preliminary SD model of NbF. The
operation transition and knowledge development are modelled as two parallel processes
as illustrated in figure 4. Both are developed through three stages, starting with the
traditional operations, followed by operations and knowledge in place and at last, mature
processes. In stage 2, operations and knowledge are in place, but not working properly.
After a while, with the right use of resources, the operations and knowledge grow mature.
But when implementing the two processes in parallel, this is a burden to people. The
new initiatives trap transition to Network based Defence. Because change is difficult, the
process is slowing down. The transition will affect the organizational structure and change
the social structure. In addition, organizational change will in most cases meet some
resistance. These factors increase the workload for the operators and reduce productivity
of learning new type of operations. In addition, maturation of new knowledge takes
time. It is easier to understand what to do, than how to do it. A knowledge gap will
Figure 5: Causal loop diagram for incidents and transition speed. Adapted from Qian [17]
be introduced, resulting in increased vulnerability and increased number of incidents.
Incidents in this context might be accidents or collateral damage on the battlefield.
How are the identified factors related to knowledge and situational awareness affecting
the operators’ perceived trust?
Results from the practical research indicate that achieving appropriate situational
awareness and adequate perceived trust are complicated, relying on information from
several sources. The user’s perceived trust in the technological platform is also challenged
by poor test and verification procedures. In addition, the knowledge gap introduced
as a result of unadjusted processes between the operation transition and knowledge
development, will affect the operators’ perceived trust, as knowledge is an antecedent
of trust [21]. When the perceived trust is too high or too low, information and systems are
not handled as expected to support Network based Defence and military operations. The
result might be increased risk and delayed transformation process.
How will the perceived trust affect the implementation of Network based Defence?
The adapted preliminary NbF SD model in figure 5 shows that an increase in the
transformation speed related to Network based Defence will increase the vulnerability,
frequency of incidents and the incident cost. These factors together with severity of
incidents are all factors affecting and adjusting the operator’s perceived trust. It can be
assumed that more severe incidents will have more significance. In addition, inappropriate
perceived trust is a vulnerability together with inadequate situational awareness. To
adjust the perceived trust and to learn from incidents, incidents and events must be
registered. The lack of routines and procedures for registering incidents identified during
the practical research, introduce challenges for the organization to learn from incidents. If
management is aware of the increased frequency of incidents, they will probably reduce
the transition speed. Lack of registering routines reduces the management’s ability to
adjust the processes of operation transition and knowledge development to each other.
Without proper routines for registering incidents, the operators might not be aware
that incidents happen. The perceived trust will not be adjusted, whether is it too high or
too low. Hence, the operators are not aware that their perceived trust is inadequate. It
might therefore be difficult to understand the risks related to the operation transition of
Network based Defence and risk during military operations. It might also be difficult to
identify factors challenging the successfulness of the implementation process.
How will a system dynamic model simplify and reduce risk related to the integration of
Network Based Defence?
Based on the previous part of the discussion, there is a strong indication that knowledge
development is not very well adjusted to the operation transition of Network based
Defence. Post-mortem assessments of system dynamic models have shown significant
cost-benefit utilization when employed in parallel with new technology adoption[14].
The costs related to delay and disruption for various projects are high, while the costs
of modelling relatively low. Estimated benefit utilization in this context, is in the ratio
200:1 [10]. This paper therefore suggests employing a full-fledged system dynamic model
in parallel with the implementation process of Network based Defence to simplify the
process and reduce risk. Such an approach has the ability to reduce giant overruns,
avoid delays and reduce damage resulting from unadjusted processes. Technological
implementations can then be simulated in advance to identify possible difficulties. Hence,
living SD models of NbF of sufficient detail can support the implementation process to
ensure implementation in time, within the estimated cost and with reduced risk.
5 Conclusion and future work
Based on the obtained results, there is a strong indication that the processes of
operation transition and knowledge development in Network based Defence are not very
well adjusted to each other, resulting in a knowledge gap. Insufficient technological
solutions, education of operators at random and complex information collection and
sharing challenge the implementation process, and will most likely result in increased
vulnerability and increased number of incidents during military operations. The
technological systems are complex, have difficult user interfaces and are under continuous
development. Hence, there seems to be a lack of knowledge related to development of
the technological platforms. The user’s knowledge of how to utilize the technological
platform is neither properly considered. Vested interest and curiosity is essential to
employ the solutions properly and get insight into advanced functionality. In addition,
the implementation process seems to lack a comprehensive approach related to education
and development of procedures.
To achieve appropriate situational awareness, information must be collected from
several sources. Even if the users are aware that presented information can be incorrect,
the operators tend to trust most of the information. Perceived trust is also affected by the
introduced knowledge gap. Inadequate perceived trust might result in inappropriate use
of the technological platform or wrong interpretation of presented information. Identified,
lacking routines for registering incidents challenge the ability to adjust the processes
of operation transition and knowledge development to each other. It is also difficult to
learn from incidents and to adjust the perceived trust among the operators. Hence, it
is difficult to understand the risks related to the operation transition of Network based
Defence and to identify factors challenging the implementation process. In order to
ensure implementation in time, within the estimated cost and with reduced risk, this
paper suggests employing a full-fledged system dynamic model in parallel with the
implementation process of Network based Defence.
Future work
In order to enhance the process of implementing Network based Defence, this research
recommend to implement a living SD model of NbF to follow the implementation process
in parallel. The SD model can e.g. be supported by the Delphi method [13] to verify
obtained results. The process must consist of domain experts including a cross sectional
group from The Norwegian Armed Forces to extend the selection from this research.
First, a proactive full SD model of NbF can be developed investigating possible scenarios
and conduct what-if studies. This model can be further developed to a customized, living
system dynamic model. By developing a living model in parallel with the implementation
process, solutions can be simulated in advance. The proactive and living models can
both serve as a basis to support consciousness around important elements and reduce risk
during the implementation of Network based Defence.
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